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Abstract
The Distributed Network Protocol v3.0 (DNP3) is
one of the most widely used protocols to control na-
tional infrastructure. The move from point-to-point
serial connections to Ethernet-based network archi-
tectures, allowing for large and complex critical in-
frastructure networks. However, networks and con-
figurations change, thus auditing tools are needed to
aid in critical infrastructure network discovery.
In this paper we present a series of intrusive tech-
niques used for reconnaissance on DNP3 critical in-
frastructure. Our algorithms will discover DNP3
outstation slaves along with their DNP3 addresses,
their corresponding master, and class object config-
urations. To validate our presented DNP3 recon-
naissance algorithms and demonstrate it’s practical-
ity, we present an implementation of a software tool
using a DNP3 plug-in for Scapy. Our implementa-
tion validates the utility of our DNP3 reconnaissance
technique. Our presented techniques will be useful
for penetration testing, vulnerability assessments and
DNP3 network discovery.
Keywords: Critical Infrastructure, Reconnaissance,
Network Discovery, Network Scanning, Substations,
DNP3, Security
1 Introduction
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
based critical infrastructure plays a significant role in
modern society due to its use in various public utilities
such as power transmission, water treatment, waste
management and transportation systems [15, 12].
SCADA systems were designed to extend communica-
tion over remote geographical locations, allowing for
the interconnectivity of once isolated control system
networks [15].
Previously these isolated control networks used
point-to-point serial communication, which deployed
a series of proprietary automation protocols to pro-
vide connectivity [17]. Such communication net-
works have now moved to Ethernet-based and IT-
based technologies to provide further performance, ef-
ficiency and reliability for critical communication [17].
This move to such technology has allowed entire crit-
ical infrastructure networks to be managed from a
centralised location such as a control centre [15].
As this move to IT-based technology has increased
interconnectivity, new equipment can be deployed
with ease, which may result with increasing architec-
ture complexity of the critical infrastructure network.
Due to this increase in complexity, network auditing
and discovery tools can provide a method of auditing
process control equipment, aid in commissioning new
equipment, and automate testing for automation as-
sets from a central location in SCADA-based critical
infrastructure networks [1].
Traditional TCP/IP communications rely on IP
address for network communication, routing and ad-
dressing. Reconnaissance tools like Nmap are utilised
for the discovery of IP based networks, but alone do
not aid in the discovery of DNP3. DNP3 is used
in SCADA-based critical infrastructure to provide
communication among distributed automation equip-
ment, which provides it’s own addressing scheme us-
ing one of 65531 DNP3 addresses which tools like
Nmap do not cater for. In addition, each DNP3 slave
device will be configured with object class variables
which contain configuration and automation data to
maintain and monitor the industrial process. Cur-
rently there are no software tools available to provide
network discovery for DNP3 networks.
Although the use of auditing and network tools is
useful for aiding the commissioning of critical infras-
tructure equipment, it is the same utility that can be
used by cyber-threats that wish to perform reconnais-
sance on critical infrastructure equipment [8]. Cyber-
attackers will utilise the reconnaissance method to
gather information about their attack targets. At-
tackers would apply various tests to determine pos-
sible access points via TCP ports, operating system
vulnerabilities and software configurations [14].
The reconnaissance phase for a remote cyber-
attack will begin using Internet as gateway to the
SCADA network [15, 16]. This process can be
achieved as the critical infrastructure’s control cen-
tre’s Internet connectivity now provides a gateway
to the SCADA network. Reconnaissance can also be
performed for insider attacks, which can be executed
by malware introduced into the critical infrastructure
network [15, 14, 16]. This demonstrates the need for
penetration testing tools to help identify possible ac-
cess points before they are discovered and exploited
from an attack.
There are various techniques such as passive, ac-
tive and intrusive network discovery that are used
for reconnaissance for SCADA based critical infras-
tructure. In this paper we will present significant
intrusive techniques that will be used during DNP3
reconnaissance. We contribute algorithms that can
be utilised to discover DNP3 addresses of outsta-
tion slaves along with their corresponding master and
their initialised class objects. In addition to our al-
gorithms, we present an implementation of a network
discovery software tool that validates our DNP3 dis-
covery algorithms through an experiment on a DNP3
virtual machine network. This will also demonstrate
it’s practical use when preforming DNP3 network dis-
covery. The software tool is developed in python using
the nmap python library and the widely used packet
manipulation tool scapy. The software tool utilises a
DNP3 scapy plug-in which is used to implement the
DNP3 protocol in our software tool. As reconnais-
sance is an issue and is typically the first phase of any
cyber-attack, it is paramount to develop a knowledge
base of the techniques used by attackers. This ex-
tended knowledge will contribute new perspectives to
help aid the development of DNP3 penetration test-
ing tools, and Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
2 Background
To help understand the ideas presented in this paper
about our algorithms and our network discovery tool,
a background of the concepts and techniques is re-
quired In this section we provide an overview of the
DNP3 protocol and how it is used in SCADA-based
critical infrastructure.
2.1 DNP3
DNP3 is one of the most widely used communica-
tion protocols for critical infrastructure, most com-
monly in the electricity industry [18]. To help under-
stand the dynamics of our DNP3 reconnaissance algo-
rithms and software tool implementation, we provide
an overview of DNP3. Westronic (now GE Harris)
proposed DNP3 in 1993, as an open and interopera-
ble industrial protocol [18]. The protocol is for com-
munication between master stations and slave devices
such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Intelli-
gent Electronic Devices (IEDs). DNP3 is now part of
the IEEE 1815-2012 standard [18].
Application
Pseudo-Transport
Data Link Data Link
Physical Media
Master Slave
Request
Response
Confirmation
Application
Pseudo-Transport
Control Center Outstation
Figure 2: DNP3 master-outstation model [18]
2.1.1 Application in a Critical Infrastructure
Network
A typical electricity distribution company’s substa-
tion will have an operations centre, making use of
master devices, to manage multiple slave devices run-
ning in outstations that are usually at a remote lo-
cation [18]. As shown in Figure 2, the master device
will send a request message to the slave device, and
the slave device will respond with a response message
that contains information to fulfil the request. In re-
sponse to receiving the slave’s response message, the
master device will reply with a confirmation message.
There may also be unsolicited messages sent from the
slave to the master in response to an event. When
developing our DNP3 reconnaissance algorithms and
the implantation of our software tool, we needed to
consider both solicited and unsolicited communica-
tion between master and slave devices. This enables
the algorithm to comply with the protocol whilst ex-
tracting master and slave address and object infor-
mation.
The slave devices in the outstation collect and
store information that is sent back to the master as
solicited or unsolicited messages to be processed at
a control centre. The substation devices are tasked
with energising or de-energising circuit breakers, and
managing voltage regulators [18, 4]. We show in Sec-
tion 5, that by using our DNP3 network discovery
algorithms and tools, it is possible to discover these
outstation slaves and their configured class data.
Data from the processes in the outstation is sent
back to the control centre where it is further pro-
cessed and can be displayed on a human machine in-
terface (HMI), which may be running on an engineer’s
computer. The engineer is also able to view the infor-
mation received by the master, and is able to interact
with the automated process in the outstation if re-
quired. DNP3 is one of the principal protocols used
to provide such forms of communication between an
outstation and a control centre [18, 4].
When designing our DNP3 test-bed and develop-
ing our algorithm, we considered its usage on com-
mon network architectures used in substations which
are supported by DNP3. These architectures include
one-to-one system, multi-drop, hierarchical and data
concentrator. We will briefly describe each of these
architectures to provide an insight into their usage.
The one-to-one network architecture supported in
DNP3 allows for communication directly between a
single master and a slave device [18, 4]. Since the
communication still flows through a network consist-
ing of network equipment such as switches or routers,
the devices’ messages are vulnerable to attacks. The
multi-drop architecture allows for one master to com-
municate with many slaves, but the master will re-
quest information from one slave at a time in a round-
robin order [18, 4]. Multi-drop architectures may also
allow masters to change roles to become a slave to an-
other master. A hierarchical architecture contains a
device, referred to as a sub-master. The sub-master
takes the role of being a slave device to a master, and
additionally takes the role of being a master to other
slave devices [18, 4]. If an attacker is able to send ma-
licious messages to the sub-master, the attack may
affect it’s master device as well. A data concentra-
tor network is used to gather information from many
slaves. This information is stored in a sub-master’s
database, which is then able to be retrieved by other
master devices [18, 4]. Data concentrator networks
typically use many other industrial control protocols
and equipment to access and use the data collected
by a sub-master device. Such an architecture means
that if an attacker maliciously manipulates a DNP3
message, then the data contained in other protocols’
messages may also be impacted.
2.1.2 Frames
The transportation of DNP3 messages, referred as
frames, operates over the physical layer mentioned
above. DNP3 messaging can be separated into 4 lay-
ers, the Physical, Data Link, Transport and Applica-
tion layers (see Figure 2). In order to discover DNP3
networks, an implementation of each layer is required
as it allows us to interact with the DNP3 device we
wish to discover. In this section we will outline each
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Figure 1: DNP3 network frame [18].
of the DNP3 layers and describe their significance in
the DNP3 network discovery process.
Data Link Layer The data link layer operates on
top of the physical layer. The data link layer provides
the interface for the transport and application layers
with the physical media. The purpose of the data
link layer is to provide addressing and error detection.
Additionally, the data link layer provides a logical
connection between communicating devices [18, 4].
The DNP3 communication requires each DNP3
device to be allocated with a unique DNP3 addresses
to enable multiple masters and multiple slaves to
share the communication channel. Each DNP3 device
on a single link or DNP3 network must be allocated
a from the range of 0 through to 65519. The DNP3
address range 65520 - 65531 is reserved for future use
and rand 65532 - 65535 is reserved for broadcast [18].
Popular network scanning tools such as nmap do not
provide a mechanism to scan for DNP3 addresses.
DNP3’s data link frame, shown in Figure 1, be-
gins with a start (START) field to identify the be-
ginning of the frame. The length field (LEN) is used
to provide the length in octets of the entire DNP3
frame. The maximum length of a frame is 292 octets.
The control (CTRL) field defines the frames direc-
tion, transaction initiator, error and flow control, and
function. The destination field (DST) identifies the
destination for the frame, whereas the source field
(SRC) identifies the source of the frame. A Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) field in the data link layer
provides integrity for the other eight octets of the data
link frame [7, 18, 4]. The data link implementation is
crucial as it will enable us to interact with the DNP3
service on our target device. By interacting with the
target slave we gain further information about it’s
master device and the state of it’s class data objects.
Transport Layer (Pseudo-Transport) The
pseudo-transport layer is responsible for the frag-
mentation of DNP3 frames. The prefix ’pseudo’ is
to indicate the layer’s limitations when compared to
the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) definition
of the transport layer [3]. As shown in Figure 1,
the pseudo-transport segment consists of 3 fields
FIN, FIR and Sequence. The last field in the
pseudo-transport segment is the auto-incrementing
SEQUENCE field, used to assure the segments are
not duplicated or missing, and are in order [18, 4].
Some DNP3 equipment may be have a poor im-
plementation of DNP3, and may be susceptible
to errors during the network discovery process [7].
By implementing a functioning pseudo-transport
layer, it should minimise the impact of system
errors during the network discovery process. For our
network discovery implementation using Scapy, we
implemented a functioning DNP3 pseudo-transport
layer to aid in the DNP3 discovery process.
Application Layer The DNP3 application frag-
ment, shown in Figure 1, begins with an application
control (App Control) The confirmation (CON)
field flags that the receiver should reply with a con-
firmation message upon receiving the DNP3 frame.
The unsolicited (UNS) field is set to true if the DNP3
fragment is an unsolicited response from the slave. If
the UNS flag is unset, then the fragment is associ-
ated with a sequence number. The sequence (SEQ)
field is used to assure the segments are not duplicated,
missing and that they are in order, as the sequence
number increments on each fragment [18, 4]. The
Function Code field is used to identify the purpose
of the fragment. The function code is used in requests
from the master and responses from the slave. There
exists 34 defined function codes for application re-
quests. [18, 7]. The application layer was developed
for the DNP3 network discovery tool, enabling us to
perform the DNP3 requests to discover class objects
on the target DNP3 slave devices.
Following the application header are the DNP3
data objects. DNP3 data objects are used to send to,
and request information from, the master and slave
databases. Examples of the object types include bi-
nary, double, analog, time, class, frozen, and datasets.
[18, 7].
DNP3 data objects use point ranges, which allows
the master to request for all points of a object group,
contiguous range of points with start and stop points,
or a list of requested points. The slave device will then
respond with the class object range specified by the
Master’s request [18]. When performing our network
discovery, we will maqurade as the master device and
make such requests to our target slaves, which will
cause it to expose all it’s initialised data objects, their
index points, and their values.
3 Related work
Stand alone traditional network discovery tools such
as Nmap, used for traditional IT network discovery,
does not encompass techniques to further assist with
network discovery for common automation protocols
used in critical such as DNP3, Profinet, Manufactur-
ing Message Specification (MMS) and Generic Ob-
ject Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) [9]. Each
of these automation protocols include additional ad-
dressing schemes and object configuration data that
requires active iteration with the automation appli-
cation for it’s discovery. Due to this challenge, there
has been a response by the research community to
provide new methods and tools in network discov-
ery for critical infrastructure. In this section we will
review related work that have contributed method-
ologies to assist with network discovery techniques
for SCADA-based critical infrastructure [9]. Related
work by Donnet and Friedman [5], provides a sur-
vey of tools and algorithms that are used to discover
TCP/IP based networks and hosts. The work pro-
vides a serious of techniques including the trace-route
algorithm, active UDP scans, DNS scans and IP ad-
dress scans. The techniques presented provide an in-
sight to the discovery of routers, networks and vari-
ous hosts of a traditional IT network, but does not
provide a methodology for discovering protocol spe-
cific hosts used in automation such as DNP3. Myers
et al. [10], provides an Internet wide scanning frame-
work that allows for the discovery of SCADA based
equipment. The related work presents an in-depth
analysis of popular network discovery tools such as
Nmap, Masscan and Zmap. The framework pro-
vides various techniques that can be used to create
a survey of the Internet, more focused on SCADA
systems. The paper discusses whitelisting, modular-
ity, scanning speed limits and scan policies to reduce
the impact or disruption of SCADA equipment be-
ing scanned. Although the work provides methods
for surveying the Internet for SCADA systems, there
was no isolated technique that was demonstrated for
DNP3.
Related work presented by Gonzalez and Papa [8],
provides passive scanning algorithms that can be
utilised for intrusion detection, and Modbus network
troubleshooting. The algorithms presented was able
to capture and process Modbus automation transac-
tion messages, and gather protocol event data and
generate Modbus network maps. The algorithms pre-
sented do provide a method for mapping Modbus net-
works, but the technique cannot be adapted for large
and complex SCADA networks that use DNP3. This
can also be said by passive network discovery theories
presented by East et al. [7] for DNP3 networks.
The proposed work by East et al. provides an at-
tack taxonomy on the DNP3 protocol [7]. The taxon-
omy provides an analysis of 28 attacks on the DNP3
protocol, which includes providing a passive recon-
naissance technique that can be used by an attacker to
gather information from each DNP3 layer. The work
presented by East et al. were all theoretical and does
not provide a practical technique to discover DNP3
networks.
A demonstration of intrusive techniques used for
DNP3 network discovery is demonstrated our previ-
ous work [13]. This work demonstrated the use of a
man-in-the-middle (MITM) using Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) poisoning to demonstrate theoretical
attacks presented by East et al.. In the work pre-
sented, a technique of eavesdropping allowed for gath-
ering of information about target master and slave
devices. Although the reconnaissance was a success,
it was limited to gateway or local network reconnais-
sance, therefore can not be adapted by a remote user
and used for ethical penetration testing.
3.1 Network Discovery in Critical Infrastruc-
ture
Network discovery is not a new concept for tradi-
tional IT infrastructures. However, mapping existing
SCADA networks for auditing, or for intrusion de-
tection is said to be challenge[1]. This is due to an
additional layer of addressing that is specific to the
automation protocol i.e the DNP3 address discussed
in section 2.1.2. In addition, the network discovery for
SCADA may also exact coil or memory register states
or configuration details from networked automation
equipment. In this section we will discuss some net-
work discovery techniques that are currently used for
Ethernet-based or Internet-based networks. We will
provide an overview of passive, active and intrusive
network discovery techniques.
3.1.1 Passive
The passive network discovery technique involves a
network device that would listen to network traffic.
The discovery device does not interact with any of the
traffic or the target devices. We will briefly overview
the two passive techniques of port mirroring and the
use of network tap.
Port Mirror A technique that can be used to anal-
yse network traffic, is through the utility of an port
mirror 1. A port mirror is a switch configuration that
allows traffic from a selected port to be forwarded to
an analysis device device. The analysis device can
be a computer installed with a high resourced net-
work interface card (NIC). The computer will then
use a network analysis tool, such as Wireshark or
TCP dump, to capture the mirror traffic transmit-
ted to the NIC.
Network Tap A network tap, is a physical network
device that provides a passive method for monitor-
ing network traffic [2]. Network taps in critical in-
frastructure can act as optical splitters, which enable
network traffic to be redirected to a network analyser
device [2]. Similar to the port mirror, the traffic can
be forwarded to a highly resourced NIC, allowing the
traffic to be analysed by a network analysis tool. Net-
work taps are commonly used for network intrusion
detection, VoIP recording and network analysis.
3.1.2 Active
Active network discovery, is a technique that requires
the interaction between the discovery device and tar-
geted networked equipment. The discovery device
would produce network transactions between the tar-
get device, in which it is able to collect address and
possible configuration information. We will briefly
overview two popular network discovery tools that are
commonly used for SCADA and network discovery.
1 MiaRec Inc (2015), What is port mirroring. URL: http://www.
miarec.com/faq/what-is-port-mirroring.
Nmap One of the most widely used network dis-
covery tools is network map (nmap)2. nmap is well
renown for it’s use for active network discovery and
network auditing. Nmap utilises IP packets to dis-
cover networked hosts, open TCP ports used for IP
services. nmap’s additional features can include oper-
ating system section and scripting engines. In recent
years, additional plug-ins scripts have been developed
to allow nmap to discover Mobus hosts and their hold-
ing registers3.
Masscan Masscan is an internet-scale network dis-
covery tool that can be utilised for surveys and data
collection by probing large subsets of the public IP
address space [6]. Masscan4 is an open-source net-
work scanner capable of scanning for a given open
port across the entire public IPv4 address range.
The Masscan scanner is capable of scanning the en-
tire internet in the space of three minutes, support-
ing TCP SYN scans, ICMP echo request scans, and
application-specific UDP scans [6].
3.1.3 Intrusive
ARP poisoning is a technique used to trick two net-
worked devices into forwarding all directed traffic be-
tween each other to a MITM device. This technique
exploits the ARP protocol used to resolve network ad-
dress MAC address with IP address in a device’s ARP
lookup table. The MITM device would poison each of
the victims ARP cache to to contain it’s MAC address
for the corresponding victim’s IP address. This would
then forward all IP traffic to the MITM device [11].
This can be an Intrusive network discovery technique
as it involves exploiting the rules of the ARP proto-
col. ARP poisoning an effective technique to perform
network discovery for DNP3 communication. This is
because all traffic can be analysed without configur-
ing additional network equipment which is required
for in-line taps or port mirrors.
As we have now provided a background of DNP3
and some discovery concepts, we will introduce some
of our algorithms to perform network discovery on
DNP3 networks. The algorithms described will be
augmented in our network discovery tool for DNP3.
4 New DNP3 Reconnaissance Algorithms
As we have introduced the background of DNP3 and
it’s functionality, and network discovery internet tech-
niques that can be used in SCADA-based, we will now
introduce our DNP3 network discovery algorithm. In
this section we will present and describes each of our
algorithms used to perform reconnaissance on critical
infrastructure. The algorithms include the process re-
sponse algorithm, short-range address discovery algo-
rithm and the full-range address discovery algorithm.
The algorithms are used to help identify slave DNP3
address and it’s corresponding master address. Fur-
ther more, the algorithms will also result in gathering
the target slave’s object class data.
4.1 Algorithms
As DNP3 has it’s own data-link and transport layer,
an implementation of DNP3 sequencing and DNP3
2Nmap.org (2003), Nmap. URL: https://nmap.org/
3Rudakov, A. (2010), modbus-discover URL: https://nmap.org/
nsedoc/scripts/modbus-discover.html
4Graham, R. D. (2014), Masscan: Mass ip port scanner, URL:
https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan
Algorithm 1 Process Response
1: rspQueue
2: rsp← False
3: addrDiscovered← False
4: procedure ProcessResponse(DNP3resp)
5: if ¬rsp ∧ ¬addrDiscovered then
6: m← DNP3resp.dst
7: s← DNP3resp.src
8: addrDiscovered← True
9: rsp← True
10: if DNP3resp.FuncCode.unsol then
11: conf ← DNP3Req(m, s,Conf())
12: send(conf)
13: req ← DNP3Req(m, s,Read(0, 1, 2, 3))
14: send(req)
15: rspQueue.put(DNP3resp)
addressing is required to achieve DNP3 network dis-
covery. Unlike active TCP/IP network discovery
methods, the discovery device would be able to per-
form a SYN scan, ARP scan or ping scan from it’s own
IP address. In the case of standalone DNP3 slaves de-
ployed in SCADA networks, the slave configuration
would only allow correspondence with one specified
DNP3 master, therefore the slave would not respond
to any request made by a non-corresponding master.
As part of our DNP3 network discovery method, the
discovery device will some need to obtain the slave’s
corresponding master’s DNP3 address. Some DNP3
slaves may have been configured to send an unso-
licited response once a TCP connection is immedi-
ately established. This is to inform the connecting
master device of the slave’s current state, i.e if the
slave has restarted or needs to be reconfigured. The
unsolicited response is then ultimately giving away
it’s slave DNP3 address and it’s corresponding mas-
ter DNP3 address. If this case occurs, we can refer
to Algorithm 1 in which discovery device has received
an unsolicited response (DNP3resp) and extract the
slave’s address s from the source field DNP3resp.src
in the data-link segment, and extracted the master’s
address m from the destination field DNP3resp.dst
from the data-link segment (see Figure 1 for the
DNP3 data-link structure).
Algorithm 2 Short-range Address Discovery Algo-
rithm
1: src← 0
2: dst← 0
3: while ¬rsp ∧ src ≤ 10 do
4: while ¬rsp ∧ dst ≤ 10 do
5: req ←DNP3Req(src, dst, Read(0, 1, 2, 3))
6: send(req)
7: dst← dst + 1
8: src← src + 1
If the slave is not configured to send an unso-
licited response upon TCP connection, this will re-
quire the discovery device to brute force the DNP3
slave for a response as we did nor receive an unso-
licited response. In SCADA based critical infrastruc-
ture networks, DNP3 equipment are usually deployed
and configured with a low DNP3 address range. This
is due to sequential additions of devices to a DNP3
network. A master would be configured with config-
ured with DNP3 address 0, and each slave added to
the network will have it’s DNP3 address incremented
by one.
Described in Algorithm 2 is what we refer to as
the short-range discovery algorithm. This algorithm
is utilised to discover slaves that have been configured
with DNP3 addresses in the range of 0 and 10 which.
This method is heavily practised in industry and can
be referred to as a short address range. The variable
src holds the value of the DNP3 source address. This
source value used by the discovery tool to masquerade
as the slave’s master, in order to cause the slave to
respond to the discovery frame. The variable src will
be initialised with a value of 0. The variable dst will
hold the value of the DNP3 destination address, which
will be the target slaves DNP3 address first initialised
as 0, as the DNP3 address range starts at 0 [18].
While we have not received a response (rsp) from
the slave, and src is less than or equivalent 10,
we will continue. We could have received rsp be-
fore the first while loop, which could indicate that
the slave has been configured with an unsolicited
response on connection. We continue to check for
rsp for the second loop for our dst loop and if
dst is less than or equivalent 10. In our second
loop we create what we call the DNP3 discovery
frame req, in which we assign the output of func-
tion DNP3Req(src, dst, Read(0, 1, 2, 3)). The func-
tion produces an entire DNP3 request frame, with a
DNP3 “read” function request of class objects 0, 1, 2
and 3. This request will cause the DNP3 slave to
send back all initialised DNP3 objects, with each of
the objects index points and their values.
The DNP3 discovery frame is then sent
(send(req)) to the slave. We then increment
dst to follow through with a second loop if the
current destination address did not result with a
response from the slave. If the second loop has ex-
hausted all the destination addresses, the source src
will then increment as the slave not been configured
with the current master address src. Once a request
reqDNP3 is received by the discovery device, we can
go back to the parallel process of Algorithm 1, to
store in queue rspQueue for further observation of
class objects in a network analysis tool.
Algorithm 3 Full-range Address Discovery Algo-
rithm
1: src← 0
2: dst← 0
3: while ¬rsp ∧ src ≤ 65519 do
4: while ¬rsp ∧ dst ≤ 65519 do
5: req ←DNP3Req(src, dst, Read(0, 1, 2, 3))
6: send(req)
7: dst← dst + 1
8: src← src + 1
Described in Algorithm 3, is a far more rigorous
algorithm as it requires the discovery tool to scan the
entire DNP3 address range for all masters and slaves.
The algorithm would cater for 65519 source src and
65519 destinations dst, resulting in the generation of
4292739361 DNP3 requests. Algorithm 3 would be
quite noisy if deployed on a network in comparison
to Algorithm 2 which would only require 121, as we
only scan for eleven DNP3 addresses (0 − 10) eleven
times.
5 DNP3 Reconnaissance Experiment
We have introduced our algorithms used to perform
DNP3 network discovery in Section 4. In this section
we will present the implementation of our discovery
algorithm on a software tool. We will present our vir-
tual network test-bed and describe our experimental
process to evaluate our DNP3 network discovery algo-
rithms. We will then analyse the experimental results
and discuss.
5.1 Virtual Test-bed
To perform our network discovery experiment, we
used a virtual machine test-bed set-up consisting of
four DNP3 slaves and one DNP3 master and one
DNP3 sub-master as depicted in Figure 3, Our test-
bed setup consisted of the mulit-drop and hierarchi-
cal DNP3 network architecture described in Section
2.1.1. Each of the virtual machines were equipped
with a Debian Linux 8.2 distribution, with an allica-
tion of 512MB of RAM. The master and slave ma-
chines were configured with respective DNP3 master
and DNP3 outstation slave programs developed us-
ing the OpenDNP3 library. OpenDNP3 is an open
source implementation of DNP3 which was developed
in C++ by Automatak5. Real-world DNP3 applica-
tions can be built using OpenDNP3, and can be de-
veloped and deployed to high-performance SCADA
servers or to resource limited embedded systems.
The DNP3 master in our test-bed was configured
with the DNP3 address of 0. DNP3 device 1 has
been configured as a sub-master device, which man-
ages DNP3 slaves 3, 4 and 5, whereas the DNP3 mas-
ter manages DNP3 devices 1 and 2. Each of the mas-
ter devices were configured to poll their designated
slaves using the Read class 1 objects request every 5
seconds, along with an integrity scan every 60 sec-
onds. Our reconnaissance device was equipped with
the Kali Linux 2.0 distribution, with the scapy library
also installed. The reconnaissance device was allo-
cated an IP address of 10.192.168.10.
5.2 Software Tool
We have described our slave discovery algorithm in
section 4, providing a solid approach to identifying
slaves and masters in a DNP3 network. In this section
we will describe the implementation of our software
tool that augments our presented algorithms. Our
DNP3 network discovery software tool has the capa-
bility of performing a full network ARP and Port scan
for a given network address range. This functionality
was performed using a python nmap library, allowing
us to perform the initial scan of the network to dis-
cover network hosts listening for DNP3 on TCP port
20000.
Once the initial network scan is complete, a list of
all responding hosts along, with an addition of pro-
viding the port status of port 20000. Once the list
has been displayed, the tool then requires the user
to select a DNP3 host with an open DNP3 port, un-
der the assumption the target host is DNP3 slave de-
vice. The tool will then creates a TCP connection,
using the Python socket library, to the selected host
by which it will begin to transmit DNP3 discovery
frames using Algorithm 2.
Scapy is a packet manipulation library, that allows
for the construction of a packet, or set of packets, as
layers that are stacked one upon another 6. We used
an implementation of a DNP3 plug-in along with our
own DNP3 spoofing library used to implement all our
DNP3 discovery algorithms presented in Section 4.
The short-range DNP3 address discovery imple-
mentation will cycle through each DNP3 address to
the DNP3 host until it receives a DNP3 response. As
5Automatak (2015), Opendnp3 project. URL: https://www.
automatak.com/opendnp3/
6Biondi, P. (2014), Scapy. URL: http://www.secdev.org/
projects/scapy/
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Figure 3: Virtual machine DNP3 critical infrastructure network Test-bed.
an asynchronous process, the tool will utilise Algo-
rithm 1, to listen for an unsolicited response, or for a
solicited response induced by a discovery frame. If the
short-range DNP3 network discovery scan fails due to
the exhaustion of the low range DNP3 addresses, then
a complete DNP3 network discovery scan will be per-
formed ranging through all DNP3 addresses to 256.
Once the tool has found the correct DNP3 master and
DNP3 slave, it will display the this information to the
user. If the tool has exhausted all 65519 master and
65519 slave address and does not manage to find the
DNP3 service, it concludes that the device does not
contain a DNP3 slave service.
5.3 Experiment
To further evaluate our DNP3 network discovery al-
gorithms, we will describe our experiment which was
performed over our virtual machine DNP3 critical in-
frastructure test-bed. In this experiment we wanted
to see if our short-range network discovery algorithm
was able to find all DNP3 slaves deployed on the vir-
tual network. From this experiment we expect to re-
trieve the each DNP3 slave’s IP address, MAC ad-
dress, DNP3 slave address and master address, and
all object class data. We loaded our DNP3 network
software tool on the reconnaissance device depicted
in Figure 3. To view our scanning progress during
the experiment, we used the graphical and interactive
network traffic analysis tool Wireshark. Wireshark
contains a DNP3 decoder which allows us to view ob-
ject data that is retrieved from the DNP3 network
scan. Our process for acquiring information from the
DNP3 slaves, will follow the tool operation procedure
outlined in Section 5.2. We first performed an APR
Scan to discover all devices in our target network,
which was then followed by a TCP port scan. Once
we received a list of hosts, we selected hosts for a
secondary DNP3 discovery scan for slaves. These se-
Figure 4: Software tool output during initial network
scan.
lected hosts must have the state of their DNP3 port
(port 20000) set to open, allowing us to scan for DNP3
addresses using the short-range DNP3 address discov-
ery algorithm described in Algorithm 2.
5.4 Results and Analysis
From our experiments, we were able to discover all
hosts providing a DNP3 slave service. Shown in Fig-
ure 4, is the tool’s output from the initial network
scan. The results show that seven hosts were dis-
covered, and identifying five hosts who had tcp port
20000 open. We manually selected our first host
10.192.168.1 which had tcp port 20000 open, and
proceeded to perform our DNP3 address discovery
scan to find it’s slave address, data objects and mas-
ter’s address.
5.4.1 Unsolicited Response Processed
Shown in Figure 5 is the resulting output from the
tool, showing it has received a DNP3 unsolicited re-
sponse from host 10.192.168.1, indicating the DNP3
Figure 5: Software tool output during DNP3 network
discovery.
service on the target host had just been restarted and
requires a configuration. From this unsolicited re-
sponse, the tool was able to extract the host’s DNP3
slave address of 1, and extract it’s corresponding
DNP3 master’s address of 0. The tool then proceeded
to send a confirm message to the slave’s unsolicited
response masquerading as the slave’s corresponding
master. The software tool then continued to send
the newly discovered slave a DNP3 discovery frame.
The discovery frame resulted in the target slave re-
sponding with a list of objects and their index point
values. This observation was made in the Wireshark
capture running during the DNP3 network discov-
ery experiment. Once we had the response contain-
ing the slaves object classes, we then proceeded to
discover our other host’s DNP3 slave service. The
same DNP3 discovery processes was performed on
host 10.192.168.2, in which the tool received an un-
solicited response upon connecting, thus revealing it’s
DNP3 slave address as 2 and it’s master as 0.
5.4.2 DNP3 Discovery Scan
By host 10.192.168.3, there was no unsolicited re-
sponse immediately received from the target host, this
required the software tool to continue with the discov-
ery scan. Shown in Figure 6, is the resulting Wire-
shark traffic from the short-range DNP3 network dis-
covery scan. We can see in Frame 812 of 6, under
Info where the tool has updated from slave range to
2 in Frame 810, to range 3. This then resulted in
finding the slaves address of 3 and it’s master address
of 1 which is shown in Frame 814 of 6, and the re-
trieval of the slave’s class objects in Frame 816 and
818. This was the same case with hosts 10.192.168.4
and 10.192.168.5, as they did not send an unsolicited
response upon connection, but relied on the short-
range network scan algorithm to induce a response.
5.4.3 All DNP3 slaves identified
Upon the completion of our experiment, we were able
to identify all DNP3 slaves on the network. Shown
in Figure 7, is the final output after performing a
DNP3 discovery scan for each of the suspected hosts
with open DNP3 port. The final results show that
10.192.168.1 was configured with the DNP3 address
1 and 10.192.168.1 was configured with the DNP3
address 2. Both of these hosts were slaves to a DNP3
master 0. Hosts 10.192.168.3 was configured with
DNP3 address 3, along with 10.192.168.4 with the
DNP3 address of 4, and finally host 10.192.168.5 was
configured with DNP3 address 5. Each of these hosts
were configured to be slaves of a master 1 which we
know is allocated to host 10.192.168.1 when we per-
formed our DNP3 address discovery scan in Figure-
fig:FirstDNP3ScanOutput, thus identifying the host
as a DNP3 sub-master.
5.4.4 Slave class data objects
During the network discovery process, we were able
to collect class data objects from each of our target
slave devices in Wireshark. discovery frame. Shown
in Figure, are the DNP3 response frames that were
a result from the discovery frames sent by the soft-
ware tool captured in Wireshark. With in each of
the response frame’s application segment, we can ob-
serve seven data objects containing 10 index points
each. The first object is a binary input status object,
followed by a double-bit input status and a binary
output status object. The final four objects are each
32-bit DNP3 objects, a binary counter, frozen binary
counter, analog input, and analog output status.
6 Discussion
As shown from the results in Section 5.4, the experi-
ment all DNP3 slaves were found. The software tool
was able to demonstrate an intrusive network discov-
ery technique to discover DNP3 slave addresses and
it’s corresponding master using the algorithms dis-
cussed in Section 4.
Some deductions can be made from the results
such as the sub-master. We can see presented, in
Figure 7, results showing host 10.192.168.1 config-
ured as a slave with the DNP3 address of 1, the 3
DNP3 slaves, 3, 4 and 5 have been configured to
talk to master 1. From these results, we can make
the deduction that 10.192.168.1 can in fact be a sub-
master. In some cases this could just be an incorrect
configuration of DNP3 equipment in which there ex-
ists two independent masters, one of which is using a
DNP3 address allocated to a slave.
Due to the success of these results, we can see such
techniques demonstrated would be a utility to per-
form reconnaissance before a cyber-attack is perform.
From the experiments we observe that each DNP3
slave was discovered by the software tool, along with
it’s class object data. This experiment demonstrates
the capability of a remote adversary. On a better
note, the techniques and algorithms presented can be
utilised for honest use for authorised users who wish
to assess SCADA equipment.
The usefulness of our presented tool for authorised
use could be for the assessment of new or unknown
pre-configured equipment. If equipment has been pro-
vided by third-party, in which an unknown configura-
tion that has been used, our tool would be able to ex-
tract master, slave and class object data, thus aiding
in the reverse engineering of it’s initial configuration.
Further more our tool can be a utility to help auto-
mate DNP3 system audits and aid in the discovery of
misplaced or misconfiguration DNP3 equipment.
In addition to auditing, our techniques can be
used to aid in the discovery rouge DNP3 equipment.
This could involve the discovery introduced malware
or malicious equipment SCADA network, thus pro-
viding a tool for intrusion detection. In addition
to the aid of intrusion detection, our tool can be
used to help understand reconnaissance techniques
though use of penetration testing. this can be used
Figure 6: Wireshark output for short-range DNP3 network discovery scan.
Figure 7: Software tool output after discovering entire DNP3 network.
Figure 8: Wireshark output showing each DNP3 outstation along with objects from outstation 5.
find DNP3 network vulnerabilities that can be ex-
ploited by cyber-threats against infrastructure net-
works. The utility of the tool can contribute to the
creation of anomaly based traffic to help aid in the de-
velopment of anomaly based intrusion detection sys-
tems.
7 Conclusion
In conclusion, in this paper we present a technique
used to perform reconnaissance on DNP3 devices.
The algorithms described in Section 4 were shown
to be effective. Their effectiveness was demonstrated
as we collected DNP3 slave corresponding master ad-
dresses ,and configured data objects using our soft-
ware tool developed using a DNP3 plug-in for Scapy.
The results of our network discovery can be seen in
Figure 7 showing the DNP3 hosts along with their
DNP3 and IP address. This was demonstrated us-
ing our virtual machine test-bed network consisting
of DNP3 hosts implemented using OpenDNP3. There
are a number of areas of future work that can be de-
rived from this paper. The network discovery tech-
nique can be taken to other automation protocols that
are implemented in SCADA network. Allowing for
new reconnaissance or network discovery techniques
for other automation protocols. In addition the tool
can be extended to generate anomalous or malicious
traffic, to aid in the development of anomaly based
intrusion detection systems.
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